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Abstract
In a real eort experiment with repeated competition we nd striking dierences in how
the work eort of men and women responds to previous wins and losses. For women losing
per se is detrimental to productivity, but for men a loss impacts negatively on productivity
only when the prize at stake is big enough. Responses to luck are more persistent and
explain more of the variation in behavior for women, and account for about half of the
gender performance gap in our experiment. Our ndings shed new light on why women may
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1 Introduction
Incentive schemes based on tournaments, where workers compete for a prize or set of prizes, are
ubiquitous in labor markets. Promotional tournaments are common in consulting, law partner-
ships, academia and industry. Firms frequently use bonus schemes based on relative performance
evaluation. Academics compete for publications in top journals. Students compete in examina-
tions to land better jobs. Workers in high-tech rms compete to develop the best innovations.
Sports stars are paid bonuses by team owners for winning leagues and cup competitions. More
generally, professional success and progression usually involves repeated competitive interactions
in the form of multiple rounds of job applications and frequent assessments for internal promo-
tions. The empirical relevance of competition-based compensation and promotion policies is
evidenced by, for instance, Eriksson (1999) and Bognanno (2001) (and the references therein),
while the seminal theoretical contribution of Lazear and Rosen (1981) elucidates many of the
incentive properties of tournament-based pay. Establishing how workers actually respond to
competition-based incentives and how these responses might vary by gender is thus crucial to
understanding how labor markets work, how competition interacts with gender to determine la-
bor market outcomes for men and women, how employers should design compensation schemes
and how governments might regulate labor market transactions and institute possible armative
action programs.
The contribution of this paper is to provide experimental evidence of how men and women
respond to winning and losing when competition is repeated. In particular, and to the best of
our knowledge, our paper is the rst to report how the work eort of men and women responds
to the outcome of previous competitions. In each of 10 rounds subjects are paired and informed
of the value of the monetary prize that they are competing for, which varies randomly across
pairings and over rounds. The prize, which can be interpreted as a relative-performance bonus,
is awarded to one of the pair members depending on the relative work eorts of the pair members
in the \slider task", which involves positioning a number of sliders on a screen, and some element
of chance or random noise which we control. The design of our real eort task allows us to collect
a nely gradated measure of productivity in each round, and hence allows us to construct a panel
dataset detailed enough to estimate accurately the impact in a given round of winning and losing
in previous rounds by gender.
In our empirical analysis we explore how eort provision responds to the outcomes of previous
rounds of competitive interaction, i.e., previous wins and losses. We use xed eects dynamic
panel data methods and control for permanent individual-level ability, time eects and prize
eects. Similarly to Ham et al. (2005), we exploit randomization induced by the experimental
design to obtain a number of valid instruments for the variables measuring previous competitive
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outcomes. We note that the randomness present in the experimental design is critical to our
identication strategy: it is this randomness that allows us to estimate the causal eect of
previous competitive outcomes on current eort provision. After controlling for permanent
individual ability, previous competitive outcomes are largely determined by chance, and therefore
we interpret the response to previous competitive outcomes as a response to luck. We show that
our results are robust to our measure of luck. Specically, we look also at the response of eort to
a purer measure of luck whereby winning is considered luckier the lower the subject's probability
of winning, which in turn is given by the dierence between the subject's own work eort and
that of his or her rival.
Our results show that men and women dier signicantly in how they respond to previous
wins and losses. Notably, we nd that for women losing when the prize is small instead of
winning the same prize induces a considerable negative eect on work eort in the next round.
However, we nd no such eect for men. Furthermore, for women conditional on losing the level
of eort in the next round is independent of the monetary value of the prize that the women
failed to win. For men, on the other hand, conditional on losing the level of eort in the next
round decreases in the size of the prize that the men failed to win. Thus, relative to winning
the smallest prize, for women losing per se is detrimental to productivity in the next round, but
for men a loss impacts negatively on productivity only when the prize at stake is big enough.
Overall, responses to previous competitive outcomes explain about 11% of the observed variation
in the work eort of women but only about 4% of the variation in the work eort of men, and
the impact of wins and losses on later work eort is also more persistent for women.
Better understanding the source and dynamics of gender dierences in competitive envi-
ronments is of prime importance for making sense of the gender gap in labor markets and
formulating appropriate policy responses. Altonji and Blank (1999) survey the large literature
on the impact of gender on labor market outcomes and conclude that \a large share of gender
dierentials remain \unexplained" even after controlling for detailed measures of individual and
job characteristics" (p. 3249). Eckel (2008) surveys the existing evidence from laboratory ex-
periments on gender dierences that might help to shed light on the gender gap. The gender
gap is particularly stark at the top of the corporate hierarchy: Bertrand and Hallock (2001)
nd that only 2.5% of top U.S. executives are female, and that these female executives earn
45% less than their male counterparts. Arguably, competition for these top jobs is more intense
than for lower or middle-ranking positions which pay less and are in greater supply. Our results
suggest that the gender gap in labor markets may be driven partly by actual and anticipated
responses to the process of winning and losing during competition, alongside more traditional
explanations such as discrimination, ability dierences and a stronger preference for investing
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in child-rearing.
In particular, our novel ndings help to shed light on why women may choose to enter
competitive work environments less frequently than men do and why they might underperform
in such environments. Decomposition analysis shows that the dierential responses by gender
to wining and losing that we nd account for about half of the gender performance gap that we
observe in our experiment with repeated competition. Furthermore, our results suggest a new
mechanism which may help to explain a greater reluctance on the part of women to compete: if
the dierential responses to winning and losing that we nd are anticipated, women may indeed
choose to enter tournaments less frequently than men and may thus be less inclined to pursue
career opportunities which involve multiple rounds of competition for new positions, promotions
and pay rises.
Our ndings in a dynamic context thus complement the growing body of evidence of female
competition aversion. This literature has not looked at how the work performance of men and
women responds to previous competitive outcomes. However, recent research has documented
that women are less likely to choose to enter a tournament, even after controlling for dierential
levels of condence, risk aversion and aversion to feedback about relative performance (Niederle
and Vesterlund, 2007).1 Using Danish survey data, Kleinjans (2009) nds a link between a dislike
for competition and occupational choice: women's stronger dislike for competition appears to
decrease expected educational achievement and increase occupational segregation. A second
strand of literature nds that the performance of women tends to deteriorate when they are
forced to compete (e.g., Gneezy et al., 2003, Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004 and Ors et al., 2008).
If women dislike competition more than men do, an appropriate response by rms may be
to reduce the degree of competition built into their pay and promotion structures. Why then
do rms not implement such policies? Two explanations suggest themselves. First, men may
fail to understand the extent to which women dislike competition and attribute too much of the
dierence in behavior across gender to ability dierences and a lower preference for work relative
to alternatives such as child-rearing. As men dominate top-ranking positions, they tend to shape
pay and promotion structures, so the gender gap may become self-perpetuating. Second, it may
be unprotable to change the remuneration structure: rms may nd it more ecient to operate
highly competitive structures in order to induce high work eort while accepting that a lower
female representation will result, especially at high rank and remuneration. The rst explanation
entails a role for government intervention on eciency grounds and the second on grounds of
equity.
1For further supporting evidence, see for instance Gupta et al. (2005), Garratt et al. (forthcoming), Vandegrift
and Yavas (2009), Cason et al. (2010) and Fletschner et al. (2010). However, Gneezy et al. (2009) nd the same
eect in a traditional patriarchal society, but not in a matrilineal one, while Charness and Villeval (2009) nd no
eect and Kamas and Preston (forthcoming) nd dierences only for business majors.
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Armative action programs to increase female representation can play a role under either
scenario. In the rst case, once female representation in higher-ranking positions improves,
greater weight will be placed on the female dislike for competition when deciding pay and
promotion policy. In the second case, the armative action may reduce eciency but will
improve equity across gender in society. Surprisingly, eciency might not be impaired: Niederle
et al. (2010) nd that a quota system, whereby at least one of two winners must be female,
causes many more high ability women to choose to enter a tournament so the average quality of
the pool of entrants is hardly aected by the quota.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the experimental design;
Section 3 provides an overview of the data; Section 4 presents the econometric model and results;
Section 5 discusses our results and concludes; Appendix A oers further robustness analysis; and
Appendix B lays out the experimental instructions.
2 Experimental design
We ran 6 experimental sessions at the Nueld Centre for Experimental Social Sciences (CESS)
in Oxford, all conducted on weekdays at the same time of day in late February and early March
2009 and lasting approximately 90 minutes. 20 student subjects (who did not report Psychology
or Economics as their main subject of study) participated in each session, with 120 participants
in total. The subjects were drawn from the CESS subject pool which is managed using the
Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (ORSEE). Gender played no role in the
subject recruitment, and gender was not mentioned in the experimental instructions. At the end
of each session, a screen appeared asking the subjects to report their gender. The experimental
instructions (Appendix B) were provided to each subject in written form and were read aloud to
the subjects. Each subject was paid a show-up fee of $4 and earned an average of a further $10
during the experiment (all payments were in Pounds sterling). Subjects were paid privately in
cash by the laboratory administrator. The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007).
At the start of each session 10 subjects were selected at random and were told that they
would be a \First Mover" for the duration of the session. The remaining 10 subjects were told
that they would be a \Second Mover" for the entirety of the session. Each session consisted of
2 practice rounds followed by 10 paying rounds. In every paying round, each First Mover was
paired anonymously with a Second Mover. The subjects were re-paired after every round using
Cooper et al. (1996)'s rotation-based \no contagion" matching algorithm. Each pair's prize was
chosen randomly from f$0:10;$0:20; :::;$3:90g and revealed to the pair members. The First
and Second Movers then completed our novel real eort \slider task" sequentially.
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The slider task consists of a screen with 48 sliders. Each slider is initially positioned at
0 and can be moved using the mouse to any integer location between 0 and 100. Each slider
has a number to its right showing its current position. A subject's \points score" in the task
is the number of sliders positioned at exactly 50 at the end of 120 seconds. Figure 1 shows
a screen of sliders as shown to the subjects in the laboratory. The slider task gives a nely
gradated measure of performance and involves little randomness; thus we interpret a subject's
point score as work eort exerted in the task. As the slider task gives a nely gradated measure
of performance over a short time scale, we can construct a panel dataset detailed enough to
allow robust statistical inference. Gill and Prowse (forthcoming) use the same dataset as here to
test for disappointment aversion by looking at within-round responses to a rival's choice of work
eort. See Charness and Kuhn (2010) for a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of
using real eort in labor market experiments.
Notes: The sliders were displayed on 22 inch widescreen monitors with a 1680 by 1050 pixel resolution. To move
the sliders, the subjects used 800 dpi USB mice with the scroll wheel disabled. To ensure that all the sliders are
equally dicult to position correctly, the 48 sliders are arranged on the screen such that no two sliders are aligned
exactly one under the other.
Figure 1: Screen showing 48 sliders.
After the Second Movers completed the task, each pair's prize for the round was awarded
to one of the pair members based on the points scores of the pair members and some element
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of chance. The probability of winning the prize for each pair member was 50 plus his or her
own points score minus the other pair member's points score, all divided by 100 (so winning
probabilities were linear in the dierence of the points scores). The winner of the prize for each
pair in every round was determined by a random draw uniform on [0; 1]: the First Mover won
the prize if and only if the draw was lower than his or her probability of winning, and otherwise
the prize was awarded to the Second Mover.
The Second Mover discovered the points score of the First Mover he or she was paired with
before starting the task. During the task, a number of further pieces of information appeared at
the top of the subject's screen: the round number; the time remaining; whether the subject was
a First or Second Mover; the prize for the round; and the subject's points score in the task so
far. At the end of the round, the subjects saw a summary screen showing their own points score,
the other pair member's points score, their probability of winning the prize given the respective
points scores, the prize for the round and whether they were the winner or loser of the prize in
that round.2
3 Overview of the data
We start by providing an overview of the data. Throughout we analyze only Second Movers:3
our sample consists of 30 male Second Movers and 28 female Second Movers observed completing
the slider task in each of the 10 paying rounds (two Second Movers did not report their gender).
The analysis focuses on behavior in rounds 3 onwards to allow for the eect on productivity of
winning or losing in the two preceding rounds. Appendix A shows that there is no eect on
work eort in a given round of winning or losing three rounds previously.
Figure 2 presents an initial summary of the raw data, split by gender. Eort choices range
from 0 to 41. Figure 2(a) shows that the distribution of eort choices for men has a bigger
right-hand tail than that for women, while Figure 2(b) shows that the eect persists during the
second half of the experiment.
The left-hand panel of Table 1 validates these observations: the proportion of women in
the right-hand tail of the overall distribution of eort choices is signicantly smaller than for
men. For example, 75% of women's work eorts lie at or below the 60th percentile of the eort
2In the practice rounds, the subjects were not told whether they had won or lost.
3We do not analyze data from the First Movers, who face a dierent situation to that of the Second Movers
on a number of dimensions: (i) First Movers face a complicated strategic problem as they can inuence Second
Mover eort through their own choice, while Second Movers face a pure optimization problem (Gill and Prowse,
forthcoming, show that the Second Movers do indeed respond to First Mover eort choices); (ii) First Movers
start the task immediately after nding out whether they won or lost in the previous round, while Second Movers
have time to internalize any psychological eects from winning or losing (while they wait for the new First Mover
they have been paired with to complete the task); and (iii) First Movers nd out what their probability of winning
was at the same time as they discover whether they won or lost the round, while Second Movers choose their
probability of winning during the task (as they know the eort of the First Mover they have been paired with).
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(a) Distributions of eorts for rounds 3-10.
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(b) Distributions of eorts for rounds 6-10.
Figure 2: Distributions of eort choices.
distribution (the proportion is signicantly greater than for men at the 5% level) and 92% lie at
or below the 80th (signicantly greater than for men at the 1% level). The right-hand panel of
Table 1 shows that these distributional dierences are persistent, as suggested by Figure 2(b).
Rounds 3-10 Rounds 6-10
Men Women Dierence SE Men Women Dierence SE
Mean eort 26.383 24.580 1.803 1.192 26.747 24.879 1.868 1.345
P(Eort  Q20) 0.217 0.243 -0.026 0.084 0.221 0.243 -0.023 0.083
P(Eort  Q40) 0.375 0.509 -0.134 0.104 0.369 0.509 -0.141 0.116
P(Eort  Q45) 0.411 0.583 -0.172 0.107 0.401 0.584 -0.183 0.110
P(Eort  Q50) 0.451 0.656 -0.205 0.100 0.435 0.644 -0.209 0.104
P(Eort  Q55) 0.486 0.706 -0.220 0.094 0.474 0.702 -0.227 0.103
P(Eort  Q60) 0.525 0.750 -0.225 0.091 0.521 0.758 -0.237 0.097
P(Eort  Q80) 0.742 0.919 -0.178 0.057 0.748 0.914 -0.166 0.066
Observations 240 224 - - 150 140 - -
Note 1: , and  denote, respectively, signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels (2-sided tests). Standard
errors are bootstrapped allowing clustering at the subject level.
Note 2: P(Eort Qj) denotes the proportion of observations at or below the jth percentile of the distribution
of eort choices, pooled over men and women. The jth percentile is dened as the smallest eort level such
that j% or more of observations lie at or below this level: because eort is discrete, we can therefore have
P(Eort  Qj) > j%.
Table 1: Descriptive analysis of eort choices of men and women.
The tendency for women not to exert high levels of eort is so strong that 66% of women's
work eorts lie at or below the median, and men complete 1.8 sliders more than women on
average (see the left-hand panel of Table 1). Figure 3 shows round by round mean eorts
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by gender: men complete more sliders on average in every round.4 Signicance tests provide
support for this gender performance gap: Table 1 reports that the proportion of women's work
eorts at or below the median is signicantly greater than for men at the 5% level (for rounds
3 onwards and for rounds 6 onwards); and a likelihood-ratio test shows that, jointly, the means
and variances of the distributions of work eort split by gender are signicantly dierent from
each other (rounds 3 onwards: p = 0:007; rounds 6 onwards: p = 0:027).5 However, the mean
performance dierence of 1.8 sliders alone is not quite signicant at conventional levels (as
outliers cause the variance to be high).
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Figure 3: Round by round mean eort choices.
4 Empirical analysis
What factors might help to explain the dierences in work eort by gender outlined in Section 3?
Clearly, men and women may dier in average ability. In this paper, we focus on a further
explanation: men and women may respond dierently to good and bad luck. In particular,
we look for gender dierences in how Second Movers respond to whether they won or lost the
previous two rounds of competition.6 We rst outline our model of behavior and discuss the
estimation strategy, and then report the results of the analysis.
4The gender dierence in mean eort might change over rounds due to dierences in learning by gender and
due to dierential responses to winning and losing in earlier rounds. Our empirical model includes both eects.
5This likelihood ratio test assumes that eort is the sum of a deterministic component and normally distributed
transient and permanent unobserved heterogeneity. The unrestricted likelihood allows the mean of eort, and
also the standard deviations of both the permanent and transitory unobservables, to vary by gender.
6As we will see in Table 2, measuring luck in terms of monetary winnings relative to what was expected does
not materially aect our results. Footnote 3 explains why we focus on Second Movers. As outlined in Appendix A,
we found no evidence that behavior in a given round was aected by winning or losing three rounds previously.
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4.1 Model and estimation strategy
We model behavior for rounds 3 onwards to allow for the eect on productivity of winning
or losing in the two preceding rounds. Our econometric strategy additionally accounts for
permanent individual-level ability dierences, time eects and prize eects. Specically, for
males, work eort in the rth round for the nth Second Mover, en;r, is given by
en;r =
2X
j=1
 
Mj Ln;r j + 
M
j Wn;r j  vn;r j + Mj Ln;r j  vn;r j

+Mvn;r+
M
r +n+un;r; (1)
and for female Second Movers en;r is given by the same expression replacing each M (for male)
with F (for female).
In (1) Ln;r 1 is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the nth Second Mover lost in
the previous round and zero otherwise. Wn;r 1 is the equivalent dummy variable in the case
of a win. Ln;r 2 and Wn;r 2 are dummy variables for losing and winning two rounds previous
to round r. Given the method of determining the allocation of each pair's prize in each round
described above in Section 2, the values of these dummy variables depend partly on the relative
work eort of the pair members, and partly on luck, in the form of the random draw.
vn;r represents the prize that the n
th Second Mover was competing for in the rth round. We
interact the dummy variables for winning and losing with the relevant prizes to allow for the
fact that the impact of winning or losing might depend on how much was won or on how much
could have been won. We also include dummy variables for losing without a prize interaction to
determine the impact of losing rather than winning independent of the prize.7
The inclusion of the M and F terms controls for any eect of the current prize on behavior.
Mr and 
F
r are round specic intercepts, which control for dierential learning and average
ability by gender. n is a round invariant subject-specic xed eect, which allows for residual
heterogeneity in ability across subjects that is not picked up by the gender and round specic
intercepts. Lastly, un;r is an unobservable that varies over rounds and over Second Movers and
captures dierences between rounds in a Second Mover's eort choice that cannot be attributed
to the other terms in the model. un;r is assumed to have mean zero and to be uncorrelated over
individuals.
The above constitutes a dynamic linear panel data model. By construction, the xed eect
n impacts on previous eorts, and therefore on previous winning and losing (as individuals with
high eort in an earlier round are more likely to have won the prize in that round), and also aects
current eort. Hence, the error term (n+ un;r) is correlated with previous winning and losing,
7 We do not include dummy variables for winning without a prize interaction as the dummy variables for
winning and losing are co-linear.
9
and it follows that the OLS estimates of the parameters in (1) will be inconsistent. We obtain
consistent parameter estimates by using panel data Generalized Method of Moments techniques
(see Arellano and Bond, 1991 and Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988, and also Bossaerts et al., 2007, for an
application of Generalized Method of Moments in an experimental setting). Specically, taking
rst dierences of (1) gives
en;r =
2X
j=1
 
Mj Ln;r j + 
M
j (Wn;r j  vn;r j) + Mj (Ln;r j  vn;r j)

+
Mvn;r +
M
r +un;r; for r = 4; :::; 10; (2)
and an analogous equation can be written for females. First dierencing therefore eliminates
the subject-specic xed eects. However, a further endogeneity problem arises in the rst
dierenced equations because the transformed error term un;r is correlated with the dummy
variables for winning or losing in round r   1 (due to the correlation between un;r 1 and en;r 1
and therefore between un;r 1 and winning and losing in the previous round).
Similarly to Ham et al. (2005), we exploit randomization induced by the experimental design
to obtain a number of valid instruments for the variables measuring the previous competitive
outcomes in the rst dierenced equations: rst, we use the random draws which determine
whether the nth Second Mover won the prize in the three rounds prior to round r; second, we
use the random prizes in these earlier rounds; third we use the random draw interacted with the
random prize for each of these earlier rounds; and fourth we use the eort choice of the nth Second
Mover's rival in these earlier rounds. Furthermore, we use the nth Second Mover's own eort
two and three rounds prior to round r, which under the assumption of zero serial correlation in
un;r are valid instruments (see footnote 12 for evidence supporting the assumption that un;r is
serially uncorrelated). All these instruments are also interacted with a dummy variable for the
subject being male.8 Appendix A shows that our results are robust to dropping various subsets
of these instruments.9
8To limit instrument proliferation, we collapse the instrument set by applying each instrument to all available
rounds jointly. Although competitive outcomes dated r 2 are not endogenous with respect to the rst dierence
of the transitory errors, we instrument for these variables in the same way as for competitive outcomes dated
r   1 in order to maintain consistency. Our results are robust to this method of identifying the coecients on
competitive outcomes dated r   2. We identify the gender-specic current prize eects and the round-by-round
changes in the gender-specic intercepts using standard orthogonality conditions based on the rst dierenced
errors and the current prize and round dummies, and interactions of these variables with gender. Finally, we form
two moment conditions based on the level equations for men and women, and these moments allow us to identify
the level of the gender-specic intercepts.
9We have also checked that our results are robust to including contemporaneous First Mover eort and First
Mover eort interacted with the prize as explanatory variables.
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4.2 Description of results
We start by reporting our parameter estimates and the associated behavioral eects. We then
consider whether our results can explain part of the gender dierence in work eorts described
in Section 3.
4.2.1 Parameter estimates
Table 2 presents the estimated parameters for our preferred specication (that is the model
outlined in Section 4.1). Figure 4 shows how these parameter estimates translate into behavioral
eects of the competitive outcome in the preceding round on current eort provision.
The large negative estimate of F1 , which is signicantly dierent from zero (2-sided p =
0:030), indicates a strong negative impact on current work eort for a woman of having lost in
the previous round independent of the value of the prize that she failed to win. However, we
nd no such eect for men (M1 is close to zero and not signicant). Reecting the estimate
of F1 , the dierence between the rst two bars of Figure 4(b) shows that for women having
experienced a loss in the previous round at the smallest prize of $0.10 instead of winning the
same prize of $0:10 induces a reduction in current work eort of 3.4 sliders. The magnitude of
this eect is sizeable in the context of a mean level of eort of 25.5 sliders in rounds 3 to 10.
In contrast, reecting that the estimate of M1 is close to zero, the negligible dierence between
the rst two bars of Figure 4(a) shows that the current work eort of men does not respond
to the outcome of the previous round of competition when the prize in the previous round was
minimal. The estimates of F1 and 
M
1 dier signicantly (2-sided p = 0:061 in the preferred
specication; 2-sided p = 0:011 in specication R4 in Appendix A, which additionally controls
for the eects of competitive outcomes three rounds previously10), which implies a signicant
dierence in how men and women respond to losing independent of the value of the prize that
they failed to win.
10As discussed in Appendix A, we nd no signicant eects of competitive outcomes three rounds previously on
current behavior, hence specication R4 is not our preferred specication. However, we do nd that controlling
for competitive outcomes three rounds previously allows us to estimate more precisely the eects of competitive
outcomes in the previous period on current work eort.
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Preferred Robustness to
Specication Measure of Luck
Estimate SE Estimate SE
M1 (Lost round r   1; Men) -0.093 0.836 -0.424 0.809
M2 (Lost round r   2; Men) -3.093 2.213 -2.922 2.262
F1 (Lost round r   1; Women) -3.499 1.611 -3.169 1.613
F2 (Lost round r   2; Women) -2.271 1.340 -2.121 1.367
M1 (Won round r   1  Prize in round r   1; Men) -0.201 0.273 -0.333 0.529
M2 (Won round r   2  Prize in round r   2; Men) -0.773 0.733 -1.584 1.456
F1 (Won round r   1  Prize in round r   1; Women) -1.299 0.570 -2.259 1.132
F2 (Won round r   2  Prize in round r   2; Women) -1.057 0.491 -1.854 0.999
M1 (Lost round r   1  Prize in round r   1; Men) -0.847 0.431 -1.254 0.549
M2 (Lost round r   2  Prize in round r   2; Men) 0.071 0.417 -0.025 0.731
F1 (Lost round r   1  Prize in round r   1; Women) 0.168 0.257 0.294 0.501
F2 (Lost round r   2  Prize in round r   2; Women) 0.125 0.502 0.292 0.988
M10 (Intercept in round 10; Men) 30.248
 2.110 30.139 1.880
F10 (Intercept in round 10; Women) 30.370
 1.945 29.811 1.993
R2 0.739 0.738
R2 (Men only) 0.772 0.773
R2 (Women only) 0.654 0.652
Partial R2 (due to winning and losing eects) 0.061 0.057
Partial R2 (due to winning and losing eects; Men only) 0.041 0.036
Partial R2 (due to winning and losing eects; Women only) 0.105 0.103
Hansen test (df, p value) 20.681 (16, 0.191) 23.299 (16, 0.106)
Observations 464 464
Note 1: , and  denote, respectively, signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels (2-sided tests). Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and allow clustering at the subject level.
Note 2: The estimates of the contemporaneous prize eects (M and F ) and of the intercepts (Mr and 
F
r )
for rounds 3 to 9 are not reported in the table. The prize eects do not dier signicantly by gender.
Note 3: We show robustness to our measure of luck by re-estimating the model with the measures of previous
monetary winnings and losses expressed relative to expectations, rather than in absolute terms. Letting Pn;r j
represent, in proportionate terms, the nth Second Mover's probability of winning the prize in round r  j, the
robustness to the measure of luck replaces Mj Wn;r j  vn;r j with Mj Wn;r j  vn;r j  (1   Pn;r j) and
Mj Ln;r j  vn;r j with Mj Ln;r j  vn;r j Pn;r j for males, and similarly for females. Because, on average,
Pn;r j = 0:5 the coecients in this alternative specication tend to be higher.
Table 2: Estimated parameters.
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(b) Women.
Notes: The eects are presented for the average male and the average female in round 10, ignoring the
contemporaneous prize eect and the impact of winning and losing two rounds previously (by setting
M = M2 = 
M
2 = 
M
2 = 0 for males, and similarly for females). Thus, after winning the eort for men is
given by M1  v + M10 and after losing it is given by M1 + M1  v + M10 , and similarly for females. Alternative
assumptions would shift the bars for men up or down relative to those for women.
Figure 4: Graphical description of impact of winning or losing in previous round.
Our estimate of F1 is close to zero and not signicant, indicating that conditional on losing in
the previous round a woman's current work eort does not depend on the value of the prize that
she failed to win. Graphically, this feature of our results is represented by the approximately
equal heights of the two white bars in Figure 4(b), which show women's work eort following a
loss at prizes of $0:10 and $3:90 respectively.11 In contrast, our estimate of M1 is negative and
signicantly dierent from zero (2-sided p = 0:049), implying that conditional on losing in the
previous round a man's work eort decreases in the size of the prize that he failed to win. This
behavioral eect is illustrated in Figure 4(a) by the notably lower height of the white bar at a
prize of $3:90 as compared to the white bar at a prize of $0:10: after losing at a prize of $3:90 in
the previous round, the current work eort of men is 3.2 sliders lower than male work eort after
losing at a prize of $0:10. The estimates of F1 and 
M
1 dier signicantly (2-sided p = 0:043;
2-sided p = 0:011 in specication R4 in Appendix A, which additionally controls for the eects
of competitive outcomes three rounds previously), which implies a signicant dierence in how
the responses of men and women to losing in the previous round depend on the value of the
prize that they failed to win.
The negative estimate of F1 , which is signicantly dierent from zero (2-sided p = 0:023),
indicates that conditional on winning in the previous round a woman's current work eort
decreases in the size of the prize that she won. This is represented graphically in Figure 4(b)
11Note that predicted eort provision at intermediate prizes can be obtained via linear interpolation.
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by the lower height of the dark bar at a prize of $3:90 as compared to the dark bar at a
prize of $0:10: after winning a prize of $3:90 in the previous round, the current work eort
of women is about 4.9 sliders lower than after winning a prize of $0:10. For a man, however,
conditional on winning in the previous round the value of the prize that he won does not impact
on current behavior (M1 is close to zero and insignicant). This is illustrated graphically by
the approximately equal heights of the two dark bars in Figure 4(a). The estimates of F1 and
M1 dier signicantly (2-sided p = 0:082; 2-sided p = 0:081 in specication R4 in Appendix A,
which additionally controls for the eects of competitive outcomes three rounds previously),
which implies a signicant dierence in how the responses of men and women to winning in the
previous round depend on the value of the prize that they won.
The above results reveal some striking gender dierences in behavioral responses to previous
competitive outcomes. In summary, the 1 and 1 estimates together imply that, relative to
winning the smallest prize of $0.10, for women losing per se is detrimental to productivity, but
for men a loss impacts negatively on productivity only when the prize at stake is big enough.
Furthermore the 1 estimates imply that, conditional on winning in the previous round, women's
current work eort declines in the value of the prize, while there is no such eect for men.
Additionally, we note here that a 2 test gives p = 0:052 for the joint null that 1, 1 and 1
do not vary by gender (the corresponding p value based on specication R4 which additionally
controls for the eects of competitive outcomes three rounds previously is 0.039).
Table 2 also provides some evidence of the persistence of these eects for women. Losing
two rounds previously dampens current eort signicantly (negative estimate of F2 ; 2-sided
p = 0:090). The eect of the prize conditional on winning also persists for two rounds (negative
estimate of F2 ; 2-sided p = 0:031). In contrast, Table 2 shows that we nd no evidence of
persistence for men over a two-round horizon. A 2 test gives p = 0:458 for the joint null that
2, 2 and 2 do not vary by gender, and therefore overall we cannot show any signicant gender
dierences in the eects of competitive outcomes two rounds previously on current behavior.
Finally, as outlined in Appendix A, we nd no evidence that winning or losing has any impact
on behavior three rounds later, either for men or for women.
The partial R2 shows that about 6% of the variation across subjects and rounds observed
in the data can be attributed to the winning and losing terms in our model. For women, the
partial R2 suggests that about 11% of the variation can be attributed to the luck terms, while
for men about 4% of the variation can be attributed to the response to luck. The Hansen test
does not reject the validity of our overidentifying restrictions; therefore we do not reject our
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additional moments.12
In the preferred specication, we use winning and losing as our measure of luck. Arguably, a
winner is luckier the more she wins relative to what she expected to win in the round, which in
turn depends both on the prize and her probability of winning (from the experimental design,
this probability depends linearly on the dierence between the winner's eort choice and that of
her rival). Similarly a loser is more unlucky the more she expected to win. In order to explore
the robustness of our results to the measure of luck we re-estimate the model replacing previous
winnings and losses with the value of previous winnings and losses relative to expectations.
Note 3 in Table 2 provides further details. The second column of Table 2 shows that working
instead with this purer measure of luck does not materially aect our results.13 The reason
is that there is little variation in winning probabilities across winners or across losers, because
winning probabilities are mostly condensed in the range [40%; 60%]. For winners, 79.2% of
observations lie in this range across all 10 rounds, while 80.8% do for losers.
4.2.2 Luck and gender dierences in eorts
Section 3 described how the whole distribution of work eorts are dierent by gender, with men
exhibiting a higher average level of eort. On average, men completed about 1.8 sliders more
than women, and a signicantly greater proportion of women's work eorts lie below the sample
median. We now use a decomposition analysis to determine the extent to which the dierential
responses to winning and losing by gender described above can account for this performance
gap between men and women.
The decomposition analysis sets the coecients on the winning and losing terms to zero, while
continuing to use the other parameter estimates. To undertake this exercise, we also make the
normalizing assumption that winning the smallest prize of $0:10 has the same behavioral impact
on men and women, so that none of the gender performance gap after winning the smallest prize
is due to a dierential response to previous competitive outcomes.14 Under this assumption,
and with the coecients on the winning and losing terms set to zero, the decomposition analysis
predicts that men outperform women by about 0.9 sliders. Thus the dierential responses to
previous competitive outcomes explain the rest of the performance gap observed in rounds 3 to
10, and so approximately 50% of the performance gap is due to the winning and losing eects.
12 In order to test for zero serial correlation in un;r, we run an Arellano-Bond test for the null hypothesis of
zero second order autocorrelation in un;r. This gives p values of 0.202 for the preferred specication and 0.143
for the specication used to check robustness to our measure of luck.
13The main dierence is that in this alternative specication the evidence for the persistence of the eects for
women is weaker.
14We need to make such a normalizing assumption because, as noted in footnote 7, the dummy variables for
winning and losing are co-linear, which means that, independent of the prize, we can only distinguish the dierence
in behavior between having won and lost a previous round.
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5 Discussion & conclusion
To the best of our knowledge our paper is the rst to study how the productivity of men and
women responds to the outcome of previous competitions. Labor markets tend to exhibit re-
peated competitive interactions: for instance, career opportunities often involve multiple rounds
of competition for new positions, promotions, bonuses and pay rises. Our novel ndings may
help in understanding better some of the sources and dynamics of gender dierences in such com-
petitive environments. Alongside more traditional explanations such as discrimination, ability
dierences and a stronger preference for investing in child-rearing, our ndings suggest that the
gender gap in labor markets may be driven partly by actual and anticipated responses to the
process of winning and losing during competition.
In particular, dierential responses by gender to wining and losing account for a signicant
portion of the gender performance gap that we observe in our experiment: to the extent that
these dierential responses are also important outside of the experimental laboratory, women in
actual labor markets will perform relatively worse as compared to men when forced to compete.
Furthermore, if the dierential responses to winning and losing that we nd are anticipated,
women may choose to select into competitive environments at a lower rate than men do. Our
results in a dynamic context thus suggest a new mechanism which may help to explain the nd-
ings of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and others that women shy away from competition even
after allowing for dierential levels of condence, risk aversion and aversion to feedback about
relative performance. As yet, beyond informal appeals to evolutionary theory, no convincing
mechanism or explanation for this residual dislike for competition has been found. As Gneezy
et al. (2009) put it: \An important puzzle in this literature relates to the underlying factors
responsible for the observed dierences in competitive inclinations" (p. 1637).
Further research is required to pin down the processes and mechanisms that might underlie
and drive the dierential responses by gender to winning and losing that we have identied.
Whether these dierences are mainly driven by nature or by environmental factors will determine
appropriate labor market policy responses. One hypothesis is that winning and losing induce
psycho-physiological responses which aect behavior in the next round and which vary by gender.
The psycho-physiology literature has identied dierences across gender in how mood (Mazur
et al., 1997), blood pressure (Holt-Lunstad et al., 2001) and condence (Roberts, 1991) respond
to competitive outcomes. There is evidence that, compared to men, women suer greater anxiety
and elevated cortisol when they compete (Filaire et al., 2009).15 Buser (2009) and Wozniak et al.
(2010) link competition aversion to sex hormones, which also suggests that physiology might
15An earlier and longer version of this paper discusses this literature and its relationship to our ndings in
greater detail (Gill and Prowse, 2010, Section 5.1).
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be important. On the other hand, Booth and Nolen (2009) and Gneezy et al. (2009) link
competition aversion to educational and familial environments, which suggests that factors such
as upbringing, culture and institutions could also play a signicant role in how men and women
react to success and failure in competitive environments.
Further research could also help explain the negative response in work eort after winning a
large prize as compared to work eort after winning a small prize that we nd for women, which
may be related to guilt or egalitarianism. The psychological discomfort associated with guilt
may impact directly on performance. Alternatively, if women feel that winning a large prize
was undeserved they may wish to reduce eort in the next period to reduce their probability
of winning and so redistribute wealth in expectation to other members of the subject pool (see
Grund and Sliwka, 2005, and Gill and Stone, 2010, for analyses of how, respectively, inequity and
desert concerns aect competitive behavior). A number of studies provide evidence from dictator
games that women are more inequity averse or egalitarian than men (e.g., Eckel and Grossman,
1998, and Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; see Croson and Gneezy, 2009, for a survey of the
evidence). Interestingly, Bartling et al. (2009) nd that the vast majority of their all-female
sample are `aheadness-averse', that is they are averse to favorable inequity; furthermore, the
study nds a signicant negative eect of aheadness-aversion on the choice to enter a tournament
for women, but no similar eect of aversion to unfavorable inequity.
Finally, we encourage researchers to uncover evidence of how men and women respond to
previous competitive outcomes in the eld. Our laboratory environment and experimental de-
sign allow us sucient control to identify cleanly responses to winning and losing. Nonetheless,
complementary evidence of the importance of the eects that we nd from labor markets, ed-
ucational environments and public elections where competition plays a large role and gender
dierences in outcomes are apparent would be invaluable. Wozniak (forthcoming) provides an
interesting rst foray in this direction by looking at the degree to which winning is positively
correlated over time for both male and female professional tennis players.
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Appendix
A Robustness
We examine the robustness of our results by: (i) re-estimating the model using dierent, more
restrictive, instrument sets and (ii) estimating the parameters of a model specication that
additionally includes variables describing competitive outcomes three rounds previously.
Results R1, R2 and R3 in Table 3 show that the parameter estimates of the preferred
specication in Table 2 are substantively unaected by various restrictions on the instrument
set, which are detailed in the notes to Table 3. The fourth set of results in Table 3, labeled R4,
shows that there are no eects on work eort in a given round of competitive outcomes three
rounds previously, and that the parameter estimates in Table 2 are not materially aected by
the inclusion of the variables detailing these extra competitive outcomes.
B Experimental instructions
Please open the brown envelope you have just collected. I am reading from the four page
instructions sheet which you will nd in your brown envelope. [Open brown envelope]
Thank you for participating in this session. There will be a number of pauses for you to ask
questions. During such a pause, please raise your hand if you want to ask a question. Apart
from asking questions in this way, you must not communicate with anybody in this room. Please
now turn o mobile phones and any other electronic devices. These must remain turned o for
the duration of this session. Are there any questions?
You have been allocated to a computer booth according to the number on the card you
selected as you came in. You must not look into any of the other computer booths at any time
during this session. As you came in you also selected a white sealed envelope. Please now open
your white envelope. [Open white envelope]
Each white envelope contains a dierent four digit Participant ID number. To ensure
anonymity, your actions in this session are linked to this Participant ID number and at the
end of this session you will be paid by Participant ID number. You will be paid a show up fee
of $4 together with any money you accumulate during this session. The amount of money you
accumulate will depend partly on your actions, partly on the actions of others and partly on
chance. All payments will be made in cash in another room. Neither I nor any of the other
participants will see how much you have been paid. Please follow the instructions that will
appear shortly on your computer screen to enter your four digit Participant ID number. [Enter
four digit Participant ID number] Please now return your Participant ID number to its
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envelope, and keep this safe as your Participant ID number will be required for payment at the
end.
This session consists of 2 practice rounds, for which you will not be paid, followed by 10
paying rounds with money prizes. In each round you will undertake an identical task lasting
120 seconds. The task will consist of a screen with 48 sliders. Each slider is initially positioned
at 0 and can be moved as far as 100. Each slider has a number to its right showing its current
position. You can use the mouse in any way you like to move each slider. You can readjust
the position of each slider as many times as you wish. Your \points score" in the task will be
the number of sliders positioned at exactly 50 at the end of the 120 seconds. Are there any
questions?
Before the rst practice round, you will discover whether you are a \First Mover" or a
\Second Mover". You will remain either a First Mover or a Second Mover for the entirety of
this session.
In each round, you will be paired. One pair member will be a First Mover and the other
will be a Second Mover. The First Mover will undertake the task rst, and then the Second
Mover will undertake the task. The Second Mover will see the First Mover's points score before
starting the task.
In each paying round, there will be a prize which one pair member will win. Each pair's
prize will be chosen randomly at the beginning of the round and will be between $0.10 and
$3.90. The winner of the prize will depend on the dierence between the First Mover's and the
Second Mover's points scores and some element of chance. If the points scores are the same,
each pair member will have a 50% chance of winning the prize. If the points scores are not the
same, the chance of winning for the pair member with the higher points score increases by 1
percentage point for every increase of 1 in the dierence between the points scores, while the
chance of winning for the pair member with the lower points score correspondingly decreases
by 1 percentage point. The table at the end of these instructions gives the chance of winning
for any points score dierence. Please look at this table now. [Look at table] Are there any
questions?
During each task, a number of pieces of information will appear at the top of your screen,
including the time remaining, the round number, whether you are a First Mover or a Second
Mover, the prize for the round and your points score in the task so far. If you are a Second
Mover, you will also see the points score of the First Mover you are paired with.
After both pair members have completed the task, each pair member will see a summary
screen showing their own points score, the other pair member's points score, their probability
of winning, the prize for the round and whether they were the winner or the loser of the round.
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We will now start the rst of the two practice rounds. In the practice rounds, you will be
paired with an automaton who behaves randomly. Before we start, are there any questions?
Please look at your screen now. [First practice round] Before we start the second practice
round, are there any questions? Please look at your screen now. [Second practice round]
Are there any questions?
The practice rounds are nished. We will now move on to the 10 paying rounds. In every
paying round, each First Mover will be paired with a Second Mover. The pairings will be changed
after every round and pairings will not depend on your previous actions. You will not be paired
with the same person twice. Furthermore, the pairings are done in such a way that the actions
you take in one round cannot aect the actions of the people you will be paired with in later
rounds. This also means that the actions of the person you are paired with in a given round
cannot be aected by your actions in earlier rounds. (If you are interested, this is because you
will not be paired with a person who was paired with someone who had been paired with you,
and you will not be paired with a person who was paired with someone who had been paired
with someone who had been paired with you, and so on.) Are there any questions?
We will now start the 10 paying rounds. There will be no pauses between the rounds.
Before we start the paying rounds, are there any remaining questions? There will be no further
opportunities to ask questions. Please look at your screen now. [10 paying rounds]
The session is now complete. Your total cash payment, including the show up fee, is displayed
on your screen. Please leave the room one by one when asked to do so to receive your payment.
Remember to bring the envelope containing your four digit Participant ID number with you but
please leave all other materials on your desk. Thank you for participating.
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Dierence in Chance of winning prize Chance of winning prize
points scores for Mover with higher score for Mover with lower score
0 50% 50%
1 51% 49%
2 52% 48%
3 53% 47%
4 54% 46%
5 55% 45%
6 56% 44%
7 57% 43%
8 58% 42%
9 59% 41%
10 60% 40%
11 61% 39%
12 62% 38%
13 63% 37%
14 64% 36%
15 65% 35%
16 66% 34%
17 67% 33%
18 68% 32%
19 69% 31%
20 70% 30%
21 71% 29%
22 72% 28%
23 73% 27%
24 74% 26%
25 75% 25%
26 76% 24%
27 77% 23%
28 78% 22%
29 79% 21%
30 80% 20%
31 81% 19%
32 82% 18%
33 83% 17%
34 84% 16%
35 85% 15%
36 86% 14%
37 87% 13%
38 88% 12%
39 89% 11%
40 90% 10%
41 91% 9%
42 92% 8%
43 93% 7%
44 94% 6%
45 95% 5%
46 96% 4%
47 97% 3%
48 98% 2%
49 Not possible as there are only 48 sliders
50 Not possible as there are only 48 sliders
Table 4: Chance of winning in a given round.
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